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Giacalone's arguments focus on his intent at the time of contracting. On this record,
the Bankruptcy Court could conclude that after the loan closed, but before disbursements
were made, Giacalone was "forced" by growing unpaid bills to misappropriate funds he
promised to use to buy machinery and equipment to pay these bills, hiding the
misappropriations from Dunlap and the City of Flint with intent to deceive. The court has
no doubt, as Giacalone argues, that delays and shortfalls in the lending process caused
him to use his loan proceeds to pay off debts before going out of business in 2004. The
argument of business desperation, however, supports the Bankruptcy Court's finding that
Giacalone intended to misappropriate the fixed asset portion of the loan to the City of Flint's
detriment, causing the City of Flint to lose $140,000.00 it could have recouped if Giacalone |
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Thu Jun 14, 2018 4:28 pm |
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had purchased fungible equipment or machinery with the proceeds.
Giacalone has proffered no authority, and the court is unaware of any authority, that
bound the Bankruptcy Judge to accept an FBI investigation as conclusive on the issues of
fund misappropriation and fraud. Giacalone's assertions that no credit check was ever
made, that Dunlap knew of the worsening financial condition of OK Industries, that Mayor
Early knew the loan would default unless restructured, and that the Flint Treasurer told him
"nobody" ever repays HUD § 108 loans, even if true, did not preclude the Bankruptcy Judge
from finding that Giacalone acted with fraudulent intent after the loan was approved in
misappropriating $140,000.00 of "fixed asset" loan proceeds to pay bills owing to trade and
other general creditors. |
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Thu Jun 14, 2018 4:33 pm |
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IV. Conclusion
This court is not left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
made. In re Rembert, 141 F.3d at 280; In re Charfoos, 979 F.2d at 392. Upon de novo
review, the Bankruptcy Court's February 6, 2007 ruling that $140,000.00 of a City of Flint
loan Giacalone personally guaranteed is excepted from discharge under 11 U.S.C. §
523(a)(2)(A) is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: February 4, 2008
s/George Caram Steeh
GEORGE CARAM STEEH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE |
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Thu Jun 14, 2018 4:36 pm |
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Thu Jun 14, 2018 4:39 pm |
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FLINT NEWS
Joseph Giacalone and Daniel Robin ordered to pay $1.3 million restitution to Flint
Posted Oct 25, 2009
By Kristin Longley
FLINT, Michigan — In one of the largest theft cases of public money local officials have ever seen, the city of Flint could be in line to land $1.3 million in restitution.
Businessmen Joseph P. Giacalone and Daniel Robin were ordered last week to pay the huge sum after pleading no contest to pocketing $1.2 million in loans for a factory they never built.
It would be a huge windfall for the cash-strapped city of Flint — if the responsible parties ever pay up. Both men have filed for bankruptcy, and it’s unclear how much the city will ever bank.
JOSEPH GIACALONE.jpgJoseph Giacalone
Still, officials say it’s a long overdue victory in the four-year-old case.
“This is one of the larger thefts of public money that I’ve ever seen,” said Genesee County Prosecutor David S. Leyton. “Most criminals are not ordered to pay that kind of money.”
Robin and Giacalone, an ex-convict who had spent time in prison for unarmed robbery and gambling convictions, pleaded no contest to larceny by conversion over $20,000 — a maximum 10-year felony.
Robin’s attorney, Glenn Cotton, said Robin has 42 days to decide whether he will file an appeal of the ruling from Genesee County Circuit Judge Judith A. Fullerton.
Neither Giacalone nor his attorney could be reached for comment.
The loans from the city were supposed to be used by Giacalone’s Lennon-based company, OK Industries, to build a vinyl manufacturing plant at a site he owned on North Saginaw Street. Giacalone in 2001 said the plant would employ 100 people, most of them low- to moderate-income people.
No work was done and none of the money was repaid, authorities said.
Knowing Giacalone’s criminal history, Genesee County Sheriff Robert J. Pickell initiated the investigation.
Dan Robin.jpgDaniel Robin
“These are con men,” he said. “White collar criminals tend to get away with stuff, but you can’t minimize crime.”
The case took several years to wind its way through the court system in art because the original larceny by conversion charges were thrown out. However, the prosecutor’s office appealed and the charges were later reinstated.
“In the end, despite the long hard road it took us to get here, we won,” Leyton said. “This is a good outcome. I’m certain the judge in the case will keep an eye on whether these individuals comply.” |
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Thu Jun 14, 2018 4:41 pm |
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People v. Giacalone
Annotate this Case
399 Mich. 642 (1977)
250 N.W.2d 492
PEOPLE v. GIACALONE
Docket No. 56005, (Calendar No. 13).
Supreme Court of Michigan.
Argued February 5, 1976.
Decided February 15, 1977.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, Robert F. Leonard, Prosecuting Attorney, Donald A. Kuebler, Chief, Appellate Division, and Joel B. Saxe, Senior Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Thomas R. McCombs for defendant.
LEVIN, J.
Joseph Giacalone, Caesar Montevecchio and Loren Jolly were charged with armed robbery.[1]
Jolly was separately tried and convicted. Giacalone and Montevecchio were tried together and convicted.
In this appeal of Giacalone's conviction,[2] he asserts that, in calling Jolly as a witness knowing *644 that he would claim the privilege against self-incrimination, the prosecutor acted improperly.
Charles Kinsman, a confederate turned state's witness, testified that he drove a getaway car. Jolly and Montevecchio entered a jewelry store and committed the robbery. Giacalone drove another getaway car.
Giacalone's roommate testified that on the morning of the robbery Giacalone awakened him and told him to leave the apartment because he thought the police were outside. Jolly was in the living room sorting jewelry. Montevecchio came in as the roommate was leaving.
Kinsman identified a necklace he had retrieved from Giacalone's sister; he said Giacalone had taken it from the stolen jewelry. The sister testified that Giacalone had given her a necklace two months after the robbery, that Kinsman had stolen the necklace from her, and that the necklace introduced at trial was not the one her brother gave her. Giacalone's mother corroborated her daughter's testimony.
Jolly's attorney advised the judge and other counsel that Jolly would claim his Fifth Amendment privilege and refuse to testify.[3] The prosecutor was permitted, over objection, to call Jolly to the stand. He asked two questions and when Jolly invoked the privilege sat down:
"Q. What is your name?
"A. Loren Jolly.
"Q. Mr. Jolly, do you recall the date of August 15, 1967?
"A. By advice of counsel, I refuse to answer on the ground that it may tend to incriminate me."
*645 A lawyer may not knowingly offer inadmissible evidence or call a witness knowing that he will claim a valid privilege not to testify. The American Bar Association standards relating to the prosecution and defense functions provide that it is unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor or a lawyer representing a defendant
"knowingly and for the purpose of bringing inadmissible matter to the attention of the judge or jury to offer inadmissible evidence";[4]
"to call a witness who he knows will claim a valid privilege not to testify, for the purpose of impressing upon the jury the fact of the claim of privilege."[5]
The rationale of the rule has been explained by the Supreme Court of Iowa:
"When an alleged accomplice invokes the privilege in the presence of the jury, prejudice arises from the human tendency to treat the claim of privilege as a confession of crime, creating an adverse inference which an accused is powerless to combat by cross-examination." State v Allen, 224 NW2d 237, 241 (Iowa, 1974).[6]
*646 A number of state courts have reversed convictions where a prosecutor called an accomplice knowing that he would exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege. State v Duhon, 332 So 2d 245 (La, 1976); Johnson v State, 158 Tex Crim 6; 252 SW2d 462 (1952); De Gesualdo v People, 147 Colo 426; 364 P2d 374; 86 ALR2d 1435 (1961). Cf. State v Vega, 85 NM 269; 511 P2d 755 (Ct App, 1973).
Michigan case law recognizes the danger that an adverse inference may be drawn from a claim of testimonial privilege. It has been held to be error for a prosecutor to call a witness, forcing the defendant in the jury's presence to claim the marital privilege or the attorney-client privilege.[7]
When Jolly declined to answer whether he recalled "the date of August 15, 1967", the date of the offense, on the ground that his answer "may tend to incriminate me" the jury may have inferred that the answer if given would have been favorable to the prosecution. The jurors were informed through Kinsman's testimony that Jolly and Giacalone had committed the offense. Jolly *647 was thus connected to Giacalone. An adverse inference from Jolly's refusal to answer may have carried over to Giacalone.
Giacalone's counsel vigorously objected to the calling of Jolly. No instruction concerning Jolly's claim of privilege was given.[8]
*648 Reversed and remanded.
KAVANAGH, C.J., and WILLIAMS, COLEMAN, FITZGERALD, and RYAN, JJ., concurred with LEVIN, J.
BLAIR MOODY, JR., J., took no part in the decision of this case.
NOTES
[1] MCLA 750.529; MSA 28.797.
[2] Montevecchio appealed separately; his conviction was reversed because of improper closing argument by the prosecutor. People v Montevecchio, 32 Mich App 163; 188 NW2d 186 (1971).
Giacalone's conviction was affirmed by a different panel of the Court of Appeals, People v Giacalone, 52 Mich App 428; 217 NW2d 444 (1974), which found the same remarks not to be sufficiently prejudicial to merit reversal in the absence of timely objection and request for a cautionary instruction.
Jolly's conviction was affirmed on appeal but sentence was vacated and the cause was remanded for sentencing because "the trial judge impermissibly considered certain matters in the sentencing process". People v Jolly, 51 Mich App 163; 214 NW2d 849 (1974).
[3] Although Jolly had already been convicted, an appeal was pending. He could still exercise the privilege. See People v DenUyl, 318 Mich 645; 29 NW2d 284 (1947).
[4] ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to the Prosecution Function and the Defense Function (Approved Draft, 1971), § 5.6(b) (the prosecution function) and § 7.5(b) (the defense function).
[5] Id, § 5.7(c) (the prosecution function) and § 7.6(c) (the defense function).
[6] The commentary accompanying the ABA Standards similarly states that the rule against calling a witness knowing that he will exercise a valid privilege not to testify is grounded in "`the impossibility of effective cross-examination and the possibility that the jury may give inferences from the claim of privilege more weight than they deserve.' Note, [Exercise of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination by Witnesses and Codefendants: The Effect Upon the Accused,] 33 U Chi L Rev 151, 154[165] (1965)." ABA Standards, supra, commentary accompanying the prosecution function, § 5.7, p 125. See, generally, Anno: Prejudicial effect of prosecution's calling as witness, to extract claim of self-incrimination privilege, one involved in offense with which accused is charged, 86 ALR2d 1443.
There is disagreement whether a claim of the self-incrimination privilege logically supports an inference of guilt. While the law draws no such inference, "the layman's natural first suggestion would probably be that the resort to privilege in each instance is a clear confession of crime". 8 Wigmore, Evidence (McNaughton rev), § 2272, p 426.
Our holding is based on evidentiary trial error. A number of recent decisions finding error in a prosecutor's calling and questioning a witness he knows will claim the privilege do so on Sixth Amendment grounds the defendant was denied his right of confrontation because the inference is not subject to cross-examination. See State v Nelson, 72 Wash 2d 269; 432 P2d 857 (1967); Commonwealth v Terenda, 451 Pa 116; 301 A2d 625 (1973); and Robbins v Small, 371 F2d 793 (CA 1, 1967), cert den 386 US 1033; 87 S Ct 1483; 18 L Ed 2d 594 (1967). See also Douglas v Alabama, 380 US 415; 85 S Ct 1074; 13 L Ed 2d 934 (1965).
We see no need to reach the constitutional issue. Difficulty in obtaining effective cross-examination has been a traditional reason for excluding evidence for example, hearsay.
[7] See People v Trine, 164 Mich 1; 129 NW 3 (1910) (marital), and People v Dahrooge, 173 Mich 375; 139 NW 22 (1912) (attorney-client).
[8] The judge instructed that Jolly was not a party to the case and that the disposition of his case had no bearing on the guilt or innocence of Montevecchio and Giacalone. He further instructed that no adverse inference should be drawn from the failure of Montevecchio and Giacalone to testify. There was, however, no instruction that an adverse inference should not be drawn against Montevecchio and Giacalone as a result of Jolly's counsel's objection to the questions put to Jolly and his refusal to testify on the ground that his testimony might incriminate him.
Asking a jury not to draw an adverse inference from a witness's claim of privilege may underscore the inference; even if some or all the jurors had missed the inference, the instruction will draw it for them. Our disposition makes it unnecessary to consider whether an instruction would cure the error.
In United States v Maloney, 262 F2d 535, 538 (CA 2, 1959), Judge Learned Hand, speaking for the Court, felt constrained to hold, on the basis of the case law at the time, that an instruction would cure the error but he said:
"As res integra, it is doubtful whether such admonitions are not as likely to prejudice the interest of the accused as to help them, imposing, as they do, upon the jury a task beyond their powers: i.e. a bit of `mental gymnastics,' as Wigmore § 2272 calls it, which it is for practical purposes absurd to expect of them."
Cases that grounded reversal on the Sixth Amendment have held that an instruction will not cure the error. See Commonwealth v Terenda, supra, and Robbins v Small, supra; San Fratello v United States, 340 F2d 560 (CA 5, 1965).
A consideration militating against allowing the error to be cured by instruction is that it would in effect vest an unstructured discretion in judges to substitute an instruction of doubtful efficacy for compliance with the well-established rule. The rule would then become that a lawyer may not call a witness who he knows will claim the privilege unless the judge allows him to do so and cautions the jury not to draw an adverse inference.
The defendant duly objected, alerting both the prosecutor and the judge to the impropriety of what was proposed, in contrast with Namet v United States, 373 US 179; 83 S Ct 1151; 10 L Ed 2d 278 (1963), where the prosecutor had a basis for believing that the privilege would not be exercised and it was debatable whether it could be validly claimed and where no objection was made.
As stated by the Court of Appeals of New Mexico:
"Nor can we agree with the proposition that defendant has the burden of showing prejudice. Under the circumstances of this case prejudice is presumed. Once the state has obtained the benefit of the inference of defendant's guilt, which is not subject to cross-examination, it cannot have the benefit of a presumption that this inference was not prejudicial and shift the burden to defendant to show there was prejudice." State v Vega, 85 NM 269, 272; 511 P2d 755, 758 (Ct App, 1973). |
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PEOPLE v. FLINT MUNICIPAL JUDGE
Docket No. 10538.
41 Mich. App. 766 (1972)
201 N.W.2d 111
PEOPLE v. FLINT MUNICIPAL JUDGE.
Michigan Court of Appeals.
Decided July 24, 1972.
View Case Cited Cases Citing Case
Attorney(s) appearing for the Case
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, Robert F. Leonard, Prosecuting Attorney, and Paul G. Miller, Jr., Chief Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Ivan E. Barris, for intervenor defendant.
Before: LESINSKI, C.J., and BRONSON and TARGONSKI, JJ.
LESINSKI, C.J.
The intervenor defendant, Joseph Cusenza, was charged on November 6, 1967, with having conspired in Flint, Michigan from August 28 through November 6, 1967, with Loren Jolly,
[41 Mich. App. 768]
Joseph Giacalone, Neil Breckenridge, Charles Kinsman, John Juarez, a/k/a Chino, and Caesar Montevecchio, a/k/a Chuck, to kill and murder Charles Thomas. MCLA 750.316; 750.505; MSA 28.548, 28.773.
After a lengthy preliminary examination before defendant Judge Thomas C. Yeotis, the prosecuting attorney asked that Joseph Giacalone, Caesar Montevecchio, Joseph Cusenza, and Loren Jolly be bound over to circuit court for trial. The people moved that the case against Neil Breckenridge, Charles Kinsman and John Juarez be dismissed but asked that Charles Kinsman be bound over as a coconspirator although not a codefendant. The motion to dismiss the charge against Neil Breckenridge and Charles Kinsman was based in part on their cooperation with the police and the prosecuting attorney.
On March 7, 1968, Judge Yeotis rendered his opinion in which he bound over for trial Jolly, Giacalone, and Montevecchio as codefendants and Kinsman as a coconspirator. The court held that Cusenza, Breckenridge, and Juarez would not be bound over because they could not be connected with the conspiracy.
The people unsuccessfully sought an original writ of superintending control in this Court directing Judge Yeotis to find probable cause as to Cusenza and to bind him over for trial in circuit court. It was held that the complaint should have been directed initially to the circuit court. People v Flint Municipal Judge, 383 Mich. 429 (1970).
The people then started over again with their writ for superintending control in the Circuit Court for Genesee County. On August 10, 1970, Judge Papp held that Judge Yeotis had failed to perform his legal duty in not weighing all the
[41 Mich. App. 769]
evidence presented, and thus clearly abused his discretion in not binding over Cusenza for trial. She remanded the case back to the magistrate with instructions that he perform his legal duty and bind over Cusenza for trial.
On September 14, 1970, a hearing on Cusenza's motion for rehearing was held. It was defense counsel's position that the recent case People v Paille #2, 383 Mich. 621, 627 (1970), required a reversal of Judge Papp's decision of August 10, 1970. In that case the Court wrote:
"In determining whether the crime of conspiracy had been committed, the magistrate had not only the right but, also, the duty to pass judgment not only on the weight and competency of the evidence, but also the credibility of the witnesses."
The motion for rehearing was denied, and Cusenza appealed to this Court which on December 18, 1970, dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, citing 1968 PA 116 and GCR 1963, 806.2(4).
On March 10, 1971, the Michigan Supreme Court granted leave to appeal and by order remanded to this Court as upon leave granted. 384 Mich. 815.
The sole issue is did the circuit court err in holding that the examining magistrate had abused his discretion in finding no probable cause that the intervenor defendant was guilty of conspiracy to murder?
Under the statute, MCLA 766.13; MSA 28.931, the magistrate at the preliminary examination must determine that the offense charged has been committed and that there is probable cause to believe that the defendant is guilty. The matter of "probable cause" has reference to the connection of the defendant with the alleged offense rather
[41 Mich. App. 770]
than to the corpus delicti. Something more than a finding of probable cause is required insofar as the commission of the crime charged is concerned. People v Asta, 337 Mich. 590 (1953).
In the present case, Judge Yeotis determined that there was a conspiracy to murder Charles Thomas, but that there was not probable cause to believe that Joseph Cusenza was a coconspirator. Judge Papp disagreed.
The Michigan Supreme Court said in People v Dellabonda, 265 Mich. 486, 490-491 (1933):
"1. To authorize the examining magistrate to bind appellant over for trial there must have been good reason to believe appellant guilty of the crime charged. Some cases hold a prima facie case against the accused must be made out. This court has not defined what constitutes probable cause, leaving each case to be determined upon its facts. Bouvier defines probable cause as, `A reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in the belief that a person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.' 3 Bouvier's Law Dictionary (Rawle's 3d Rev.), p. 2728.
* * *
"Primarily the question of probable cause is for the consideration of and determination by the examining magistrate. This court may not agree with the findings of such magistrate but it has no right to substitute its judgment for his except in case of a clear abuse of discretion."
A circuit court is no more at liberty than is this Court or the Supreme Court to substitute its judgment for that of the magistrate. We do not weigh the evidence to determine the facts, but we do examine it to determine whether it justifies the action of the circuit court in holding that the magistrate was guilty of an abuse of discretion.
[41 Mich. App. 771]
People v Karcher, 322 Mich. 158 (1948). The circuit judge's conclusion that the magistrate did not weigh all the evidence and that this was a clear abuse of discretion is not supported by the record.
Examination of the transcript shows a conspiracy to murder Charles Thomas, a paid police informer. The conspiracy apparently developed when Joseph Giacalone learned that Thomas was informing, and he made plans with Charles Kinsman to kill Thomas. Giacalone arranged to sell Thomas some counterfeit money at the Avalon Motel in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and Giacalone and Kinsman then flew to Pennsylvania where they met Caesar Montevecchio and Loren Jolly. The four went to the Sheridan Hotel in Pittsburgh and the details of the conspiracy to kill Thomas were discussed. Kinsman who had been selected to do the shooting decided to withdraw from the conspiracy and to return to Michigan. Jolly was then substituted as the triggerman. Thomas survived the attempt on his life and identified Jolly as his would-be assassin.
Judge Yeotis in his opinion placed major reliance on the lack of motive for Cusenza to conspire to murder Thomas. The Judge also took special note of the fact that Charles Kinsman, an admitted coconspirator, testified that although he was deeply involved in the conspiracy he had no personal knowledge of Cusenza's being a part of it. The transcript does show that Joseph Cusenza's bar and restaurant called Nino's was a hangout of the alleged coconspirators, and that Cusenza was a trusted confidant of them. However, the fact that Cusenza appears to have been aware of some of the nefarious activities of the alleged coconspirators does not mandate a finding of probable cause that he conspired with them to do murder.
[41 Mich. App. 772]
It was Judge Yeotis' right and duty to pass judgment on the credibility of the witnesses as well as the weight and competency of the evidence. Consideration of the testimony presented at the preliminary examination has not revealed a clear abuse of discretion. Therefore, his findings must stand. People v Paille #2, supra.
The order of superintending control issued by the circuit court shall be set aside and the order of dismissal by the magistrate shall be reinstated.
All concurred.
Post Wed Oct 26, 2016 4:45 pm
This story of this robbery and burglary ring captured Flint headlines for months, especially when Thomas was able to testify after being shot in the head twice.
This case raised questions of why Leonard was allowed to take an undercover operation out of the state and asked whether this group was part of an organized crime group.
It also resulted in attempts to murder the prosecutor and witnesses.
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Flint's Giacalone Tried To Rubout Informant & Prosecuting Atty. In
gangsterreport.com/jack-of-all-trades-flints-giacalone-tried-to-rubout-informant-prose...
The mob subunit in Flint, Michigan led by Joseph (Joe White) Giacalone, kin to ... marked Thomas and Genesee County Prosecutor Robert Leonard for death.
JACK OF ALL TRADES: FLINT’S GIACALONE TRIED TO RUBOUT INFORMANT & PROSECUTING ATTY. IN 1960S MOB DOUBLE DIP
Scott BurnsteinDetroit and Featured and Mafia and Mafia Insider and Midwest and Mob Hits
The mob subunit in Flint, Michigan led by Joseph (Joe White) Giacalone, kin to the notorious Giacalone mafia clan down in Detroit, attempted to kill a fellow crew member and a Genesee County prosecutor back in the 1960s. Giacalone and his co-conspirators were almost successful in offing one of their own, but didn’t make nearly as much headway in their plan to eliminate the man tasked with putting them behind bars.
Giacalone, 78, died of natural causes earlier this year. At the time of his death, he owed the city of Flint, a frequently financially-hamstrung community an hour north of Motown, 1.3 million dollars for loans he accepted from the municipality towards the building of a factory that went into his pockets instead of into any form of construction.
When he was in his 20s, Giacalone was running gambling and heist rackets out of a Flint area bar called Nino’s, surrounded by a group of hoodlums, thieves and bookies. One of Giacalone’s underlings was Charles Thomas, who got jammed up with local police in a drug deal and agreed to cooperate in building a case against the boys at Nino’s. Within a few months, Giacalone was tipped off that Thomas was a rat.
According to court files and police reports, Giacalone marked Thomas and Genesee County Prosecutor Robert Leonard for death. The contract on Leonard never got much traction. Thomas, on the other hand, was lucky to have come out of the whole incident alive.
Per the court records, Giacalone decided to lure Thomas to Pennsylvania with the promise of a counterfeit money score. Giacalone and two of his henchmen, Charles Kinsman and Loren Jolly traveled to Pittsburgh in late August 1967 and met up with Erie, Pennsylvania mob figure Caesar (Chuck the Cannon) Montevechio at the Sheraton Hotel.
Montevechio was associated with both the mafia syndicates in Cleveland and Pittsburgh and helped Giacalone organize the hit. The plan was to clip Thomas at the Avon Motel in nearby Avon, Pennsylvania. Kinsman eventually left back for Michigan before the attempt on Thomas’ life was made.
Flint’s Joe Giacalone
On August 31, 1967, Jolly shot Thomas twice in the back of the head inside a room at the motel. Thomas survived and identified the shooter to authorities as Jolly. Less than three months later, Giacalone and several others were indicted for the two attempted murders and bookmaking and armed robbery linked to their affairs in Flint. Jolly, Kinsman and Thomas all testified against Giacalone at his trial.
It was Jolly and Kinsman who clued the FBI in on the conspiracy to knock off Leonard. Law enforcement surveillance details reported seeing Kinsman visit Leonard in his office in the Genesee County Circuit Court.
Giacalone was convicted and sentenced to 50 years in prison of which he did 20. He walked free in November 1987. Montevechio would go on to be found guilty in the high-profile Erie gangland execution of bookmaker Frank (Bolo) Dovishaw in 1983. He had acted as a fence for stolen property coming from mobsters in Michigan, including Giacalone’s Flint contingent. Leonard, tied by FBI documents to Detroit Mafioso James (Jimmy Eyes) Tamer, got booted from the prosecutor’s office in 1980 for embezzling Genesee County funds and did three years of prison time. |
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Thu Jun 14, 2018 5:11 pm |
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The information that I receives is that Joe Giacalone of Flint was no relation to the mafia in Detroit. In fact I am confident none of the Flint Giacalones are related to the Detroit mafia.
During the trial the witnesses were said to have been hidden out of town. Frustrated at being unable to find them, the hired out-of-town killer was told to target Prosecutor Robert Leonard. Leonard had a habit of working late at night in his corner office (now a part of the Clerk's office) where he was visible from the street. However, the Flint coordinator for this contract killer was a second police informant. Notified of the impending hit, the Prosecutor's family was relocated as was the Prosecutor. The task force leaders and the Prosecutor were in the hotel room next to the hired killer listening to the wiretaps. When the when the killer was called to another job he told the gang the had "one bought and paid for". Calls to the Ohio police where the hired gun came from gave a name and confirmation that he was a mafia hit man.
Last edited by untanglingwebs on Sun Jun 17, 2018 11:00 am; edited 1 time in total |
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Sun Jun 17, 2018 10:51 am |
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| I have heard the story many times about an attempt on the lives of the witnesses. When they were returned to Flint for the trial, they got bored waiting to testify. Somehow they got permission to take a trip to Williams Gun Club in Davison. There was an attempted ambush along rural road along the way which was countered by the protective detail. I was told the only injury was the poor farmer who fell off the ladder on his barn when the gunfire ensued. |
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Sun Jun 17, 2018 10:57 am |
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When looking at the costs involved in the OK Industries default, I believe the costs of the multiple lawsuits that were filed need to be considered.
There were at least 5 lawsuits filed (1 by Flint and 1 dismissed)and 4 of these cases went to the Federal District Court. Giacalone filed bankruptcy .
US District Court Judge Gerald Rosen NO. 07-12662
lower Court Case # 07-86307 NO, Judge Judith Fullerton
OK Industries , Joseph Giacalone and Deanne Giacalone vs Captain Christopher Swanson, Donald Williamson, Robert Pickell, and Karen Hansen |
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Sun Jun 17, 2018 11:19 am |
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The response of Donald Williamson:
Plaintiffs allege that defendant Williamson made slanderous statements against Plaintiffs. Now the Court sua sponte filed a motion for Plaintiffs to show cause why Defendant Williamson should not be dismissed from this case. Defendant Williamson agrees that he should be dismissed.
Statement of Facts
This is a matter in which the Defendant Donald Williamson is being sued for defamation over the allegations that he made statements accusing J. Giacalone and OK Industries of stealing funds borrowed through the City of Flint in the form of a HUD Section 108 loan. Plaintiffs allege that defendant Williamson was not performing a governmental or quasi-judicial function when the defendant allegedly made false and malicious statements about about Plaintiffs having stolen funds borrowed through the City of Flint in the form of a HUD Section 108 loan, Plaintiffs allege that these statements are slander per se. |
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Sun Jun 17, 2018 11:51 am |
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Argument
1. On November 1, 2007 , the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the order dismissing the charges of larceny by conversion as to the City of Flint's Section 108 funds and the FAIF funds. The Court of Appeals held that there was probable cause to believe that defendants converted the funds with larcenous intent,
(Upon information received a portion of he funds ere used to pay child support by Dan Robin, Giacalone's partner in OK Industries. ) |
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Sun Jun 17, 2018 12:02 pm |
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