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untanglingwebs
El Supremo
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Wed Apr 15, 2015 2:44 pm |
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untanglingwebs
El Supremo
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CHAPTER THIRTEEN: THE COURTROOM: THE PRETRIAL AND TRIAL PROCESS
DID THE JURY POOL SATISFY THE FAIR CROSS SECTION REQUIREMENT?
BERGHUIS V. SMITH
__U.S.___ (2010)
Ginsburg, J.
Issue
The Sixth Amendment secures to criminal defendants the right to be tried by an impartial jury drawn from sources reflecting a fair cross section of the community. The question presented in this case is whether that right was accorded to respondent Diapolis Smith, an African-American convicted of second-degree murder by an all-white jury in Kent County, Michigan in 1993. At the time of Smith’s trial, African-Americans constituted 7.28% of Kent County’s jury-eligible population, and 6% of the pool from which potential jurors were drawn. In Duren v. Missouri , this Court described three showings a criminal defendant must make to establish a prima facie violation of the Sixth Amendment ’s fair-cross-section requirement. He or she must show: “(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a ‘distinctive’ group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process.” The first showing is, in most cases, easily made; the second and third are more likely to generate controversy. he defendant in Duren readily met all three measures. He complained of the dearth of women in the Jackson County, Missouri, jury pool. To establish underrepresentation, he proved that women were 54% of the jury-eligible population, but accounted for only 26.7% of the persons summoned for jury service, and only 14.5% of the persons on the postsummons weekly venires from which jurors were drawn. To show the “systematic” cause of the underrepresentation, Duren pointed to Missouri’s law exempting women from jury service, and to the manner in which Jackson County administered the exemption. Concluding that no significant state interest could justify Missouri’s explicitly gender-based exemption, this Court held the law, as implemented in Jackson County, violative of the Sixth Amendment ‘s fair-cross-section requirement.
We here review the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit holding that Smith “satisf[ied] the prima facie test established by Duren ,” and granting him habeas corpus relief, i.e., release from imprisonment absent a new trial commenced within 180 days of the Court of Appeals’ order. Despite marked differences between Smith’s case and Duren’s, and a cogent Michigan Supreme Court decision holding that Smith “ha[d] not shown … systematic exclusion,” the Sixth Circuit found the matter settled. Cognizant of the restrictions Congress placed on federal habeas review of state-court convictions, the Court of Appeals considered that a decision contrary to its own would “involv[e] an unreasonable application o[f] clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” …. According to the Sixth Circuit, Smith had demonstrated that a Kent County prospective-juror-assignment procedure, which Smith calls “siphoning,” “systematic[ally] exclu[ded]” African-Americans. Under this procedure, Kent County assigned prospective jurors first to local district courts, and, only after filling local needs, made remaining persons available to the countywide Circuit Court, which heard felony cases like Smith’s. The Michigan Supreme Court, however, had rejected Smith’s “siphoning” plea for lack of proof that the assignment procedure caused underrepresentation. We review the Sixth Circuit’s reversal of the Michigan Supreme Court.
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Facts
On November 7, 1991, Christopher Rumbley was shot and killed during a bar brawl in Grand Rapids, Michigan. The bar was crowded at the time of the brawl, with 200-to-300 people on the premises. All patrons of the bar were African-American. The State charged Smith with the murder in Kent County Circuit Court. Voir dire for Smith’s trial took place in September 1993. The venire panel included between 60 and 100 individuals. The parties agree that, at most, three venire members were African-American. Smith unsuccessfully objected to the composition of the venire panel. Smith’s case proceeded to trial before an all-white jury. The case for the prosecution turned on the identity of the man who shot Rumbley. Thirty-seven witnesses from the bar, including Smith, testified at the trial. Of those, two testified that Smith fired the gun. Five testified that the shooter was not Smith, and the remainder made no identifications of the shooter. The jury convicted Smith of second-degree murder and possession of a firearm during a felony, and the court sentenced him to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole.
On first appeal, the Michigan Court of Appeals ordered the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on Smith’s fair-cross-section claim. The hearing occurred in early 1998. Smith’s evidence showed that Grand Rapids, the largest city in Kent County, was home to roughly 37% of Kent County’s population, and to 85% of its African-American residents. Felony charges in Kent County were tried in a sole Circuit Court. Misdemeanors were prosecuted in 12 district courts, each covering a discrete geographical area. To fill the courts’ venires, Kent County sent questionnaires to prospective jurors. The Circuit Court Administrator testified that about 5% of the forms were returned as undeliverable, and another 15 to 20% were not answered. From the pool of prospective jurors who completed questionnaires, the County granted requests for hardship exemptions, e.g., for lack of transportation or child care. Kent County then assigned nonexempt prospective jurors to their local district courts’ venires. After filling the district courts’ needs, the County assigned the remaining prospective jurors to the Circuit Court’s panels. The month after voir dire for Smith’s trial, Kent County reversed the assignment order. It did so, according to the Circuit Court Administrator, based on “[t]he belief … that the respective districts essentially swallowed up most of the minority jurors,” leaving the Circuit Court with a jury pool that “did not represent the entire county.” The Jury Minority Representation Committee, its co-chair testified, held the same view concerning the impact of choosing district court jurors first and not returning unused persons to the pool available for Circuit Court selections. The trial court considered two means of measuring the extent of underrepresentation of African-Americans on Circuit Court venires: “absolute disparity” and “comparative disparity.” “Absolute disparity” is determined by subtracting the percentage of African-Americans in the jury pool (here, 6% in the six months leading up to Smith’s trial) from the percentage of African-Americans in the local, jury-eligible population (here, 7.28%). By an absolute disparity measure, therefore, African-Americans were underrepresented by 1.28%. “Comparative disparity” is determined by dividing the absolute disparity (here, 1.28%) by the group’s representation in the jury-eligible population (here, 7.28%). The quotient (here, 18%), showed that, in the six months prior to Smith’s trial, African-Americans were, on average, 18% less likely, when compared to the overall jury-eligible population, to be on the jury-service list.
Isolating the month Smith’s jury was selected, Smith’s statistics expert estimated that the comparative disparity was 34.8%. In the 11 months after Kent County discontinued the district-court-first assignment policy, the comparative disparity, on average, dropped from 18% to 15.1%. Smith also introduced the testimony of an expert in demographics and economics, who tied the underrepresentation to social and economic factors. In Kent County, the expert explained, these forces made African-Americans less likely than whites to receive or return juror-eligibility questionnaires, and more likely to assert a hardship excuse. The hearing convinced the trial court
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that African-Americans were underrepresented in Circuit Court venires. But Smith’s evidence was insufficient, that court held, to prove that the juror-assignment order, or any other part of the jury-selection process, had systematically excluded African-Americans. The court therefore rejected Smith’s fair-cross-section claim.
The Michigan Court of Appeals concluded that the juror-allocation system in place at the relevant time did result in the underrepresentation of African-Americans. Reversing the trial court’s judgment, the intermediate appellate court ordered a new trial, with jurors selected under the Circuit-Court-first assignment order installed shortly after the voir dire in Smith’s case. The Michigan Supreme Court, in turn, reversed the Court of Appeals’ judgment, concluding that Smith “ha[d] not established a prima facie violation of the Sixth Amendment fair-cross-section requirement.” The Michigan High Court observed, first, that this Court has specified “[no] preferred method for measuring whether representation of a distinctive group in the jury pool is fair and reasonable.” The court then noted that lower federal courts had applied three different methods to measure fair and reasonable representation: the absolute and comparative disparity tests, and “the standard deviation test.”
Recognizing that no single test was entirely satisfactory, the Michigan Supreme Court adopted a case-by-case approach allowing consideration of all three means of measuring underrepresentation. Smith’s statistical evidence, the court found, “failed to establish a legally significant disparity under either the absolute or comparative disparity tests.” Nevertheless “grant[ing] [Smith] the benefit of the doubt on unfair and unreasonable underrepresentation,” the Michigan Supreme Court ultimately determined that “he ha[d] not shown systematic exclusion.” Smith’s evidence, the court said, did not show “how the alleged siphoning of African American jurors to district courts affected the circuit court jury pool.” In particular, the court observed, “[t]he record does not disclose whether the district court jury pools contained more, fewer, or approximately the same percentage of minority jurors as the circuit court jury pool.” The court also ruled that “the influence of social and economic factors on juror participation does not demonstrate a systematic exclusion.”
In February 2003, Smith filed a habeas corpus petition in the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan, reasserting his fair-cross-section claim. Because Smith is “in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court,” the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), §2254, governed the District Court’s review of his application for federal habeas corpus relief. Under the controlling provision of AEDPA, codified in §2254(d), a state prisoner’s application may not be granted as to “any claim … adjudicated … in State court” unless the state court’s adjudication
“(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
“(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”
Applying these standards, the District Court dismissed Smith’s habeas petition. The Court of Appeals reversed. Where, as here, the allegedly excluded group is small, the Sixth Circuit ruled, courts should use the comparative disparity test to measure underrepresentation. In that court’s view, Smith’s comparative disparity statistics sufficed “to demonstrate that the representation of African American veniremen in Kent County … was unfair and unreasonable.” As to systematic exclusion, the Sixth Circuit, in accord with the Michigan intermediate appellate court, believed that the juror-assignment order in effect when Smith’s jury was empaneled significantly reduced
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the number of African-Americans available for Circuit Court venires. Smith was entitled to relief, the court concluded, because no important state interest supported that allocation system.
The State petitioned for certiorari attacking the Sixth Circuit’s decision on two principal grounds: First, the State charged that the federal appellate court erred in adopting the comparative disparity test to determine whether a distinctive group was underrepresented in the jury pool. . Second, the State urged that, in any event, “there was no … systematic exclusion of African Americans from juries in Kent County, Michigan,” and no warrant for the Sixth Circuit’s contrary determination. According to the Sixth Circuit, the Michigan Supreme Court’s rejection of Smith’s Sixth Amendment plea “involved an unreasonable application o[f] clearly established Federal law, as determined by [this Court in Duren ].” §2254(d)(1)We disagree. As explained below, our Duren decision hardly establishes—no less “clearly” so—that Smith was denied his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury drawn from a fair cross section of the community.
Reasoning
To establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, this Court’s pathmarking decision in Duren instructs, a defendant must prove that: (1) a group qualifying as “distinctive” (2) is not fairly and reasonably represented in jury venires, and (3) “systematic exclusion” in the jury-selection process accounts for the underrepresentation. The defendant in Duren successfully challenged Jackson County’s administration of a Missouri exemption permitting any woman to opt out of jury service. . The Court explained why it was plain that defendant Duren had established a prima facie case. First, women in Jackson County were both “numerous and distinct from men.” Second, Duren’s “statistical presentation” showed gross underrepresentation: Women were over half the jury-eligible population; in stark contrast, they accounted for less than 15% of jury venires. Duren also demonstrated systematic exclusion with particularity. He proved that women’s underrepresentation was persistent—occurring in every weekly venire for almost a year—and he identified the two stages of the jury-selection process “when … the systematic exclusion took place.” First, questionnaires for prospective jurors stated conspicuously that women could opt out of jury service. Less than 30% of those summoned were female, suggesting that women in large numbers claimed the exemption at the questionnaire stage. “Moreover, at the summons stage women were … given another opportunity to [opt out].” And if a woman ignored the summons, she was deemed to have opted out; no further inquiry was made. At this “final, venire, stage,” women’s representation plummeted to 14.5%. In the Federal District Court serving the same territory, the Court noted, despite a women-only childcare exemption, women accounted for nearly 40% of those actually serving on juries.
The “disproportionate and consistent exclusion of women from the [Jackson County] jury wheel and at the venire stage,” the Court concluded, “was quite obviously due to the system by which juries were selected.” “[A]ppropriately tailored” hardship exemptions, the Court added, would likely survive a fair-cross-section challenge if justified by an important state interest. But no such interest, the Court held, could justify Missouri’s exemption for each and every woman—the altogether evident explanation for the underrepresentation.
As the Michigan Supreme Court correctly observed, neither Duren nor any other decision of this Court specifies the method or test courts must use to measure the representation of distinctive groups in jury pools. The courts below and the parties noted three methods employed or identified in lower federal court decisions: absolute disparity, comparative disparity, and standard deviation.
Each test is imperfect. Absolute disparity and comparative disparity measurements, courts have recognized, can be misleading when, as here, “members of the distinctive group comp[ose] [only] a small percentage of those eligible for jury service.” And to our knowledge, “[n]o court … has
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accepted [a standard deviation analysis] alone as determinative in Sixth Amendment challenges to jury selection systems.” On direct review, as earlier stated, the Michigan Supreme Court chose no single method “to measur[e] whether representation was fair and reasonable.” Instead, it “adopt[ed] a case-by-case approach.” “Provided that the parties proffer sufficient evidence,” that court said, “the results of all of the tests [should be considered].” In contrast, the Sixth Circuit declared that “[w]here the distinctive group alleged to have been underrepresented is small, as is the case here, the comparative disparity test is the more appropriate measure of underrepresentation.”
Even in the absence of AEDPA’s constraint, we would have no cause to take sides today on the method or methods by which underrepresentation is appropriately measured. Although the Michigan Supreme Court concluded that “[Smith’s] statistical evidence failed to establish a legally significant disparity under either the absolute or comparative disparity tests,” that court nevertheless gave Smith “the benefit of the doubt on underrepresentation,” It did so in order to reach the issue ultimately dispositive in Duren : To the extent underrepresentation existed, was it due to “systematic exclusion.
Addressing the ground on which the Sixth Circuit rested its decision, Smith submits that the district-court-first assignment order systematically excluded African-Americans from Kent County Circuit Court venires. But as the Michigan Supreme Court not at all unreasonably concluded, Smith, Smith’s evidence scarcely shows that the assignment order he targets caused underrepresentation. Although the record established that some officials and others in Kent County believed that the assignment order created racial disparities, and the County reversed the order in response, the belief was not substantiated by Smith’s evidence.
Evidence that African-Americans were underrepresented on the Circuit Court’s venires in significantly higher percentages than on the Grand Rapids District Court’s could have indicated that the assignment order made a critical difference. But, as the Michigan Supreme Court noted, Smith adduced no evidence to that effect. Nor did Smith address whether Grand Rapids, which had the County’s largest African-American population, “ha[d] more need for jurors per capita than [any other district in Kent County].” Furthermore, Smith did not endeavor to compare the African-American representation levels in Circuit Court venires with those in the Federal District Court venires for the same region. Smith’s best evidence of systematic exclusion was offered by his statistics expert, who reported a decline in comparative underrepresentation, from 18 to 15.1%, after Kent County reversed the assignment order. This evidence—particularly in view of AEDPA’s instruction, §2254(d)(2)—is insufficient to support Smith’s claim that the assignment order caused the underrepresentation. As Smith’s counsel recognized at oral argument, this decrease could not fairly be described as “a big change.” In short, Smith’s evidence gave the Michigan Supreme Court little reason to conclude that the district-court-first assignment order had a significantly adverse impact on the representation of African-Americans on Circuit Court venires.
To establish systematic exclusion, Smith contends, the defendant must show only that the underrepresentation is persistent and “produced by the method or ‘system’ used to select [jurors],” rather than by chance. In this regard, Smith catalogs a laundry list of factors in addition to the alleged “siphoning” that, he urges, rank as “systematic” causes of underrepresentation of African-Americans in Kent County’s jury pool. Smith’s list includes the County’s practice of excusing people who merely alleged hardship or simply failed to show up for jury service, its reliance on mail notices, its failure to follow up on nonresponses, its use of residential addresses at least 15 months old, and the refusal of Kent County police to enforce court orders for the appearance of prospective jurors. No “clearly established” precedent of this Court supports
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Smith’s claim that he can make out a prima facie case merely by pointing to a host of factors that, individually or in combination, might contribute to a group’s underrepresentation. Smith recites a sentence in our Duren opinion that, he says, placed the burden of proving causation on the State. The sentence reads: “Assuming, arguendo , that the exemptions mentioned by the court below [those for persons over 65, teachers, and government workers] would justify failure to achieve a fair community cross section on jury venires, the State must demonstrate that these exemptions [rather than the women’s exemption] caused the underrepresentation complained of.” That sentence appears after the Court had already assigned to Duren—and found he had carried—the burden of proving that the underrepresentation “was due to [women’s] systematic exclusion in the jury-selection process.” The Court’s comment, which Smith clipped from its context, does not concern the demonstration of a prima face case. Instead, it addresses what the State might show to rebut the defendant’s prima facie case. The Michigan Supreme Court was therefore far from “unreasonable,” §2254(d)(1), in concluding that Duren first and foremost required Smith himself to show that the underrepresentation complained of was “due to systematic exclusion.”
This Court, furthermore, has never “clearly established” that jury-selection-process features of the kind on Smith’s list can give rise to a fair-cross-section claim. In Taylor , we “recognized broad discretion in the States” to “prescribe relevant qualifications for their jurors and to provide reasonable exemptions.” And in Duren , the Court understood that hardship exemptions resembling those Smith assails might well “survive a fair-cross-section challenge,” In sum, the Michigan Supreme Court’s decision rejecting Smith’s fair-cross-section claim is consistent with Duren and “involved [no] unreasonable application o[f] clearly established Federal law,” §2254(d)(1).
Holding
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opi
Questions for Discussion
1.
What is the holding in Duren?
2.
Can you explain why the Michigan Supreme Court and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed with one another?
3.
Why does the U.S. Supreme Court reverse the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals?
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Wed Apr 15, 2015 2:46 pm |
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untanglingwebs
El Supremo
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Flint 911, City of
Director: Ms. Pamela Coleman
310 East 5th Street
Flint, MI 48502
Admin No. (810) 766-7285
24/7 No. (810) 766-7232
Fax No. (810) 766-8671
E-mail: pcoleman@cityofflint.com
Genesee County 911 Authority
County Coordinator: Mr. Lloyd Fayling
Director: Mr. Lloyd Fayling
G-4481 Corunna Road
Flint, MI 48532
Admin No. (810) 732-4720
24/7 No. (810) 732-4720
Fax No. (810) 732-7986
E-mail: LRF@geneseecounty911.org |
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Wed Apr 15, 2015 3:02 pm |
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untanglingwebs
El Supremo
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| Many are upset about Coleman's new starting salary of allegedly $87,000. If the sweetheart deals for the other County 911 are any indication, current staff has a right to be upset! |
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Wed Apr 15, 2015 3:04 pm |
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untanglingwebs
El Supremo
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| If the county has control over the 911, then will the city be required to pay for the liason position of Coleman? Two administrator positions will be eliminated. There will be two distinct units within the newly combined 911, a county unit and a Flint unit. |
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Thu Apr 16, 2015 7:58 am |
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untanglingwebs
El Supremo
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The County 911 Director is Loyd Fayling. A copy of his 2013 & 2014 contract reflects a salary of $105,498 increased 10% in 2013 TO $116,048 and a 4% increase in 2014 to $120,689.92. Without a new contract and no renegotiations there is an automatic renewal of 3% for the next two years after the end of the contract.
Fayling will receive an $8,000 flat rate for the use of his personal vehicle. At the end of 2014, Fayling will be allowed 35 days vacation and 30 days personal. He can have his unused days paid off at the end of each fiscal year or he can carry these hours over. Upon retirement or termination, he will receive a 100% pay off for unused days.
He receives a paid $50,000 life insurance as well as a paid short term and long term disability insurance policy. He receives a flat rate of $500 per month for dental and vision. The county pays 18%of Fayling's base pay towards his retirement and Fayling pays 5% of his base pay. |
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Thu Apr 16, 2015 8:31 am |
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untanglingwebs
El Supremo
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Will Coleman's salary be comparable to that of Genesee County 911 Deputy Director David Ackley?
His contract reflects a salary of $87,592 as of September 30,2014.
He receives a flat rate of $400 per month for the use of his personal vehicle.
His vacation days were 23 in 2013. However there is a handwritten notation that the 23 days for 2014 is 184 hours. A payoff of 14 days vacation can be paid off can be paid off annually or carried over and additional days lost.
He received 18 days personal in 2013, but there is another handwritten note of 152 hours in 2014. The intent is unclear as the document shows 10 (14) unused personal paid off per year or carried over. Additional personal time is lost.
The county will pay for all professional development, tuition travel costs.
The county provide a $30,000 life insurance plus AD& D insurance. They also pay for short and long term disability insurance. He receives $225 per month for health insurance. He pays 5% towards retirement nd the county pays 15%. |
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Thu Apr 16, 2015 8:47 am |
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untanglingwebs
El Supremo
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Coleman is the current Flint 911 Director. Since there may be two separate units with in the newly revised county system, will she receive the same benefits packet as Ackley?
I am being told Coleman will have a new position (title unknown) and her salary will come from the Flint Police department.
Last edited by untanglingwebs on Thu Apr 16, 2015 5:52 pm; edited 1 time in total |
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Thu Apr 16, 2015 8:49 am |
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untanglingwebs
El Supremo
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Flint council will most likely lose their bid to keep their own jury pool. I don't understand how Ward Chapman is the person who has the final say on this issue. Former Genesee County Corporate Council, he came to work for the city as a part time attorney under the Emergency Manager. This decision should come from City Attorney Peter Bade and not Chapman.
The county is controlling more of the city and I have my doubt in the ability of the city to continue to remain a viable entity. There has been talks of a Metropolitan Police force for years. Will the next move be to dismantle Flint's Police force?
I am most concerned about the number of Flint employees that could lose their jobs because they are minorities. A recent court case focused on what appears to be racist attitudes in the County Human Resources department. This will not bode well for our Flint employees.
Pamela Coleman is the current 911 Director. Reports are she is being cut a deal to have an employment situation comparable to that of Ackley of the County 911. rumors are rampant that she received her promotion while dating a former Police Chief. |
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Thu Apr 16, 2015 5:20 pm |
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untanglingwebs
El Supremo
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http://www.mlive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2015/01/city_report_says_flint_genesee.html#incart_related_stories
City report says Flint, Genesee County 911 merger could be complete by June 30,
Ron Fonger | rfonger1@mlive.com By Ron Fonger | rfonger1@mlive.com
on January 15, 2015 at 8:00 AM, updated January 15, 2015 at 8:09 AM
FLINT, MI -- A new report from the city's departing emergency manager says the merger of Flint and Genesee County 911 systems could be completed by June 30.
"As a part of this process, the city of Flint will contribute $325,000 toward the $1.2 million cost for new equipment and building expansion at the (county 911) consortium's Corunna Road location," the Jan. 8 report from former emergency manager Darnell Earley says.
In September, Earley and county 911 Director Lloyd Fayling announced plans for Flint to return to the countywide emergency dispatch system -- a shift that comes about two decades after Flint left the county system.
The merged system means calls for emergency police and fire help in the city of Flint will be answered by county dispatchers rather than Flint 911 personnel.
Flint officials have estimated an annual savings for the city of about $1 million as a result of the merger.
Flint's return to the county 911 system will eliminate 28 dispatch positions, but Fayling said that one city dispatcher has already been hired and another six are in final testing stages and are expected to be working soon.
Fayling said fewer than 10 Flint dispatchers have applied for positions with the county 911 system.
Last edited by untanglingwebs on Sun Apr 19, 2015 7:53 am; edited 1 time in total |
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Sun Apr 19, 2015 7:42 am |
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untanglingwebs
El Supremo
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http://www.mlive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2014/09/after_nearly_20_years_apart_fl.html
After nearly 20 years apart, Flint will rejoin Genesee County 911 system
Ron Fonger | rfonger1@mlive.com By Ron Fonger | rfonger1@mlive.com
on September 11, 2014 at 2:08 PM, updated September 11, 2014 at 2:09 PM
FLINT, MI -- Two decades after the city of Flint broke away from the Genesee County emergency dispatch system, the two sides are getting back together again.
Flint emergency manager Darnell Earley and county 911 Director Lloyd Fayling announced Thursday, Sept. 11, the plans for Flint to return to the countywide system by July 1, 2015.
The merged system means calls for emergency police and fire help in the city of Flint will be answered by county dispatchers rather than Flint 911 personnel.
Earley said the change will mean a savings of about $1 million annually for the city, potential new revenue to beef up funding for police and fire operations, both of which suffered personnel cuts in the current fiscal year.
"The idea of being part of the consortium was more of a driving factor" than cost savings, Earley said, calling the arrangement "another example of excellent regional cooperation."
"The idea is to improve every aspect of dispatch," the emergency manager said, from how quickly calls are answered to upgraded communication technology for police officers and firefighters.
Flint's return to the county 911 system creates uncertainty for 28 dispatchers, who Earley said could land in positions at an expanded county 911 center or in different jobs inside City Hall.
"We will be very vigilant about those employees," he said.
The Flint Journal could not immediately reach Mark Kovacs, president of the Flint Firefighters Union, for comment on the decision to fold the Flint 911 center.
Fayling said taking over emergency dispatching in the city will require more employees, additional equipment and an expansion of the county 911 center in Flint Township.
Earley said the city will pay $325,000 toward the $1.2 million in expenses for the expanded county 911 center, which will now handle dispatching for every village, city and township in the county except the city of Fenton, which handles its own emergency dispatches.
The 911 director said Flint's rejoining the county system is "not a simple task, but it's a worthy task."
Flint's change of heart on handling 911 calls has come in the years since former Mayor Woodrow Stanley decided to break away from the countywide system in 1995, taking Flint's share of 911 surcharge funds with him.
Although Flint officials claimed then that it would be cheaper and more efficient to handle emergency calls independently, a series of elected and appointed officials have found themselves short on cash and unable to afford expensive 911 upgrades since the breakup.
In 2002, Flint's emergency financial manager explored the idea of returning to the county 911 system after the city found itself facing a nearly $1 million shortfall in its 911 budget.
In 2008, talks restarted briefly during the administration of former Mayor Don Williamson.
A feasibility study focused on combining services was completed, but merger talks ultimately faded away.
In a 2012 grant application, the city revealed the Charles Stewart Mott Foundation had funded a new study aimed at determining the costs and other requirements to complete a merged system.
Flint received a $1.8 million grant to install a new communications tower to improve radio coverage in areas where police and firefighters have had little or no radio coverage.
Officials said that tower will be incorporated into the county 911 system.
Flint Councilwoman Victoria VanBuren said Thursday that city and county officials need to work closely to make sure Flint's incorporation into the county dispatch system is smooth.
"We need to all be on the same page," VanBuren said. "Hopefully, it's not done haphazardly." |
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Sun Apr 19, 2015 7:46 am |
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untanglingwebs
El Supremo
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Mon Apr 20, 2015 10:18 pm |
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untanglingwebs
El Supremo
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Flint Council won't challenge deal to merge Flint, Genesee district courts
l
Ron Fonger | rfonger1@mlive.com By Ron Fonger | rfonger1@mlive.com
on April 20, 2015 at 6:50 PM, updated April 20, 2015 at 6:51 PM
FLINT, MI -- A divided City Council has decided not to challenge a proposed deal to consolidate Flint and Genesee County District Courts.
Council voted 5-4 to approve a memorandum of understanding, spelling out the terms of the merger, Monday, April 20.
The vote came after an attorney for the city told council members that state law doesn't allow for Flint-only jury pools in courts presided over by judges elected from the city.
"The (State Court Administrative Office) is not going to contravene what the Legislature" has written, attorney Ward Chapman told the council. "They didn't say anything to allow a jury pool different than what the Legislature has said."
The State Court Administrative Office recommended the court consolidation, and the county Board of Commissioners and Flint emergency manager Jerry Ambrose had already agreed to the arrangement before council delayed action on it last week.
Because Flint remains under the control of a state-appointed emergency manager, council would have had to come up with a substitute plan for the court consolidation had it turned down the deal approved by Ambrose.
Any council plan also would have required approval of a state emergency loan board.
Council members Eric Mays, Wantwaz Davis, Herbert Winfrey and Monica Galloway voted against the consolidation. Council members Jackie Poplar, Kerry Nelson, Josh Freeman, Vicki VanBuren and Scott Kincaid voted for the deal, which is estimated to save the city $8.4 million in the first 10 years.
Council members who voted against the deal said they had concerns about the merger because of the jury pool issue and because of questions about protections for employees of Flint District Court.
Current Flint District Court employees would get preference in hiring in the countywide district court system, but no guarantees, Genesee Circuit Court Chief Judge Richard Yuille has said.
The memorandum of understanding says Flint District Court will be abolished by Jan. 2, 2016, with the combined Genesee County District Court established at the same time. |
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Mon Apr 20, 2015 10:20 pm |
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untanglingwebs
El Supremo
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| If the 911 hiring is any indication of the opportunity for Flint employees to be employed by the county, there may be issues. The city 911 will be a separate unit within the county 911 facility. I am told that current employees with many years of experience are not being hired. Age discrimination, race discrimination or other excuses? |
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Mon Apr 20, 2015 10:26 pm |
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untanglingwebs
El Supremo
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The county 911 has built in barriers to employment. One that is being talked about is the Detroit based woman who performs the psychological exams. Individuals who passed previous psychological exams are being rejected by this lady.
Two males, one white and 1 a minority, have been bypassed. A female minority with an unblemished record and years of experience has also been rejected. Is there a bias in the system? Not all racism is overt.
Last edited by untanglingwebs on Tue May 05, 2015 7:26 pm; edited 1 time in total |
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Wed Apr 22, 2015 8:47 am |
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